Cyril Smith shows that Marx developed a far richer and liberatory vision of humanity and the alternative to capital than that which has characterized his followers, and he makes a powerful argument that it is essential to return to Marx's original body of thought in order to reconstitute a viable critique of existing capitalist society.

This work has been selected by scholars as being culturally important, and is part of the knowledge base of civilization as we know it. This work was reproduced from the original artifact, and remains as true to the original work as possible. Therefore, you will see the original copyright references, library stamps (as most of these works have been housed in our most important libraries around the world), and other notations in the work. This work is in the public domain (...) in the United States of America, and possibly other nations. Within the United States, you may freely copy and distribute this work, as no entity (individual or corporate) has a copyright on the body of the work. As a reproduction of a historical artifact, this work may contain missing or blurred pages, poor pictures, errant marks, etc. Scholars believe, and we concur, that this work is important enough to be preserved, reproduced, and made generally available to the public. We appreciate your support of the preservation process, and thank you for being an important part of keeping this knowledge alive and relevant. (shrink)

The study of biodiversity spans many disciplines and includes data pertaining to species distributions and abundances, genetic sequences, trait measurements, and ecological niches, complemented by information on collection and measurement protocols. A review of the current landscape of metadata standards and ontologies in biodiversity science suggests that existing standards such as the Darwin Core terminology are inadequate for describing biodiversity data in a semantically meaningful and computationally useful way. Existing ontologies, such as the Gene Ontology and others in the Open (...) Biological and Biomedical Ontologies (OBO) Foundry library, provide a semantic structure but lack many of the necessary terms to describe biodiversity data in all its dimensions. In this paper, we describe the motivation for and ongoing development of a new Biological Collections Ontology, the Environment Ontology, and the Population and Community Ontology. These ontologies share the aim of improving data aggregation and integration across the biodiversity domain and can be used to describe physical samples and sampling processes (for example, collection, extraction, and preservation techniques), as well as biodiversity observations that involve no physical sampling. Together they encompass studies of: 1) individual organisms, including voucher specimens from ecological studies and museum specimens, 2) bulk or environmental samples (e.g., gut contents, soil, water) that include DNA, other molecules, and potentially many organisms, especially microbes, and 3) survey-based ecological observations. We discuss how these ontologies can be applied to biodiversity use cases that span genetic, organismal, and ecosystem levels of organization. We argue that if adopted as a standard and rigorously applied and enriched by the biodiversity community, these ontologies would significantly reduce barriers to data discovery, integration, and exchange among biodiversity resources and researchers. (shrink)

The dissertation concerns F. A. Hayek’s critique of legislation. The purpose of the investigation is to clarify and assess that critique. I argue that there is in Hayek’s work a critique of legislation that is distinct from his well-known critique of social planning. Further that the main claim of this critique is what I refer to as Hayek’s legislation tenet, namely that legislation that aims to achieve specific aggregate results in complex orders of society will decrease the welfare level. The (...) legislation tenet gains support; from the welfare claim – according to which there is a positive correlation between the utilization of knowledge and the welfare level in society; from the dispersal of knowledge thesis – according to which the total knowledge of society is dispersed and not available to any one agency; and from the cultural evolution thesis – according to which evolutionary rules are more favorable to the utilization of knowledge in social cooperation than are legislative rules. More specifically, I argue that these form two lines of argument in support of the legislation tenet. One line of argument is based on the conjunction of the welfare claim and the dispersal of knowledge thesis. I argue that this line of argument is true. The other line of argument is based on the conjunction of the welfare claim and the cultural evolution thesis. I argue that this line of argument is false, mainly because the empirical work of political scientist Elinor Ostrom refutes it. Because the two lines of argument support the legislation tenet independently of each other, I argue that Hayek’s critique of legislation is true. In this dissertation, I further develop a legislative policy tool as based on the welfare claim and Hayek’s conception of coercion. I also consider Hayek’s idea that rules and law are instrumental in forging rational individual action and rational social orders, and turn to review this idea in light of the work of experimental economist Vernon Smith and economic historian Avner Greif. I find that Smith and Greif support this idea of Hayek’s, and I conjecture that it contributes to our understanding of Adam Smith’s notion of the invisible hand: It is rules – not an invisible hand – that prompt subjects to align individual and aggregate rationality in social interaction. Finally, I argue that Hayek’s critique is essentially utilitarian, as it is concerned with the negative welfare consequences of certain forms of legislation. And although it may appear that the dispersal of knowledge thesis will undermine the possibility of carrying out the utilitarian calculus, due to the lack of knowledge of the consequences of one’s actions – and therefore undermine the legislation tenet itself – I argue that the distinction between utilitarianism conceived as a method of deliberation and utilitarianism conceived as a criterion of correctness may be used to save Hayek’s critique from this objection. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Reviewed by:Fabuler la fin du monde: La puissance critique des fictions d’apocalypse by Jean-Paul EngélibertCyril CamusJean-Paul Engélibert. Fabuler la fin du monde: La puissance critique des fictions d’apocalypse [Fabulating the end of the world: The critical power of apocalypse fiction]. Paris: Éditions La Découverte, 2019. 239 pp. Print. 20€. ISBN 978-2-348-03719-1.Jean-Paul Engélibert is a well-established expert on apocalyptic and postapocalyptic fiction. His exploration of the genre thus far includes (...) the monograph Apocalypses sans royaume: Politique des fictions de la fin du monde, XX–XXIe siècles (2013), numerous articles, as well as the essay collection L’Apocalypse: Une imagination politique, XIXe–XXIe siècles (2018), which he co-edited. In his latest book, Fabuler la fin du monde, he returns to several texts and aspects of the genre previously covered, delving deeper into what he calls “fictions of the end of the world.” In the ten chapters, gathered in five parts, he approaches his subject as a seasoned scholar in the field of comparative literature, and his analysis draws from comparisons between modern fiction’s representation of apocalypse and biblical literature’s visions of apocalypse and messianism. The book also offers ecocritical insights into the specter of Anthropocenic manifestations in fiction, with reflections on the interrelated genres of utopia and dystopia, theories of cinema, and philosophical writings on the catastrophic history of the twentieth and twenty-first centuries.The range of fictional works discussed is wide, including Jean-Baptiste Cousin de Grainville’s Le dernier homme (1805); Mary Shelley’s Frankenstein (1818); Émile Souvestre’s Le monde tel qu’il sera (1846); Didier de Chousy’s Ignis (1883); Robert Merle’s Malevil (1972); José Saramago’s Blindness (1995); Antoine Volodine’s Minor Angels (1999); Don DeLillo’s Cosmopolis (2003); Cormac McCarthy’s The Road (2006); Céline Minard’s Le dernier monde (2007); Davide [End Page 163] Longo’s The Last Man Standing (2010); and Margaret Atwood’s MaddAddam trilogy (Oryx and Crake [2003], The Year of the Flood [2009], and MaddAddam [2013]). Engélibert also touches on feature-length movies such as Stanley Kramer’s On the Beach (1959), Lars von Trier’s Melancholia (2011), Abel Ferrara’s 4:44 Last Day on Earth (2012), and Mamoru Oshii’s Ghost in the Shell (1995), as well as on other literary and audiovisual fictions, such as E. M. Forster’s short story “The Machine Stops” (1909), Edward Bond’s dramatic trilogy The War Plays (1985), and the first season (2014) of Damon Lindelof and Tom Perrotta’s TV series The Leftovers (2014–17).Engélibert’s exegeses of the genre build around two aspects of the evolving relationship of apocalyptic narratives to the context of their production. Apocalypse (in the sense of “the end of the world” rather than the etymological sense of “revelation”) is no longer primarily a religious myth: the creation and use of the atomic bomb during the Second World War, the theorization of the Anthropocene, and the mainstreaming of concerns over climate change have made the term “apocalypse” a very real, tangible prospect for the future. Engélibert relies on Günther Anders’s Die atomare Drohung (1981) to highlight the importance of the A-bomb in bringing home the reality of potential annihilation to people’s collective consciousness. Yet his second contextual/historical point is that the Anthropocene (albeit unnamed at the time) actually started with the Industrial Revolution, and that thinkers and polemicists such as Charles Fourier or Eugène Huzar, as well as contemporary fiction writers, were already acknowledging the environmental impact of humans and their economic/industrial/technological activity as threats to human and nonhuman life, and to the health of the planetary system itself.1Citing the work of Jean-Baptiste Fressoz and Christophe Bonneuil on the history of climate science, Engélibert analyzes in detail several nineteenth-century novels (namely Le Dernier homme, Frankenstein, Le monde tel qu’il sera, and Ignis) and one early-twentieth-century story (Forster’s “The Machine Stops”) that denounce the harm that the idol of the time, Progress, was already wreaking on nature and human life... (shrink)

William James, like his father before him, devoted much attention to religion. He defended the human desire to have faith in something, or some being, whose existence could not be empirically defended. Faith generated a feeling of ease and peacefulness, and therefore could be considered a moral good. In The Varieties of Religious Experience James argued that faith could be discovered and enacted in unconventional ways.Mr. Schulte has redefined James’s thesis to support Alcoholic Anonymous 3rd edition. He claims that James (...) provided the germinal idea of the AA program according to the program’s cofounders Bill Wilson and Dr. Bob Smith. Schulte uses Varieties in an adulterate fashion: each of the 8.. (shrink)

We live in a time of moral confusion: many believe there are no overarching moral norms, and we have lost an accepted body of moral knowledge. Alasdair MacIntyre addresses this problem in his much-heralded restatement of Aristotelian and Thomistic virtue ethics; Stanley Hauerwas does so through his highly influential work in Christian ethics. Both recast virtue ethics in light of their interpretations of the later Wittgenstein's views of language. This book systematically assesses the underlying presuppositions of MacIntyre and Hauerwas, (...) finding that their attempts to secure moral knowledge and restate virtue ethics, both philosophical and theological, fail. Scott Smith proposes alternative indications as to how we can secure moral knowledge, and how we should proceed in virtue ethics. (shrink)

The critic Cyril Connolly once pointed out that diarists don’t make novelists. He went on to describe the problem for the would-be writer. “Writing for oneself: no public. Writing for others: no privacy” (Cyril Connolly, Journal). This paper addresses Connolly's worry about the public ad private: how can we reconcile the inner and conscious dimension of speech with its outer and public dimension? For if what people mean by their words involves, or consists in, what they have in (...) mind when they speak then how can what someone has in mind — the meaning she attaches to her words — be at the same time publicly accessible to others on the basis of her behaviour? The issue is whether there is a notion of the linguistic meaning of an expression that can do justice to both speakers’ inner experience of comprehension and to what is outwardly available in their public practice. (shrink)

The final moments of King Vidor's melodrama, Stella Dallas is famous as a tableau of exquisite pathos and feeling. This paper examines Stanley Cavell's reading of Vidor's tableau of an unknown woman in relation to Linda Williams's earlier feminist reading, it examines Cavell's dispute with Williams and seeks to offer a different reading of the film that takes the contemporary art historical discourse about tableau as its guide, and comes to the conclusion that Vidor's tableau anticipates the 'return to (...) painting' that marks Jeff Wall's famous photographic lightbox Picture for Women. Vidor's tableau is itself a lightbox that articulates the tension in American culture and life between the propriety of social order and the impropriety of modern social mobility. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Huributt, Hume, Newton and the Design Argument Stanley Tweyman Abookfamiliartomanyofus,Hume,NewtonandtheDesignArgument, originally published in 1965, was recentlyreissued.1 The original work traces natural theology and the design argument from antiquity to the present. It analyses Hume's critique in the Dialogues Concerning Natural Religion, and shows one of his main targets to be the Newtonian formulation ofthe design argument andits effort to exploit science for religious purposes. In the reissued edition, (...) a supplementary essay is added, " The Dialogues as a Work of Art." In this essay, Hurlbuttargues that Hume used the dialogue form because he believed it to be an effective way to explore and expressively reveal the dialectical structure of certain kinds of philosophical and religious belief. In my own work on Hume's Dialogues Concerning Natural Religion,2 I acknowledge the importance of the dramatic components present in this work: that Pamphilus is a student of Cleanthes; that the initial assessment ofthe three speakers is provided by Hermippus (ofwhom we know nothing); that Pamphilus tells us that Philo was "a little embarrassed and confounded" after hearing Cleanthes' illustrative analogies in part 3; that Philo distances himselfat the end of part 8 from the sceptic's attack on all religious systems, and, in particular, from the attack in parts 2-8 in regard to Cleanthes' Argument from Design; that Demea's a priori argument in part 9 is criticized largely by Cleanthes rather than, as we mighthave expected, by Philo; that Demea takes leave of the discussion at the end of part 11; that Philo speaks of his "unfeigned sentiments" on the subject of natural religion in part 12; that the final pronouncement on the whole ofnatural theology (spoken by Philo) is regarded as the position which "some people seem to maintain"; that it is Pamphilus who, at the end ofthe Dialogues, assesses the 'principles' ofthe three main speakers; and that Hume speaks in his own person only once in this work, and then only in a footnote—these matters and several others were viewed as relevant to understanding the work as a whole and, therefore, were dealt with at great length. In his essay, Hurlbutt treats a familiar theme in a novel way. He supports the view, popularized largely by Norman Kemp Smith, that the literature on the Dialogues does not ordinarily take seriously the Volume XIX Number 1 167 STANLEY TWEYMAN fact that Hume chose to produce the Dialogues as a work of art. Hurlbutt therefore insists that he will not analyse the Dialogues as an argumentative essay "that is in an external fashion rhetorically embellished, and thus made more 'artful', in order to manipulate the reader and to hide or distance the author from the opinions therein" (p. 213). Such views, he urges, impoverish both Hume and the Dialogueshyimplying that he is deceitful, and by severely limiting the rich character ofthe Dialogues: T assume that Hume's decision to set the religious and theological arguments out in dialogue form was a rational act in a deeper sense, a sense tied to the things a successful work of art can do; things that a scientific essay, or even an 'artful essay", cannot do, or do so well" (ibid.). The main theme of Hurlbutt's essay—also its most original feature—is that by focusing on the Dialogues as a work of art, we will come to see that "a set ofexplicit arguments and beliefs are set out, in a series oflinked episodes, by a group ofexplicit speakers. By processes ofabstraction we can discover an implicit argument that is not wholly identical with any explicit ones, and an implicit speaker not identical with any one of the explicit speakers" (p. 215). Hurlbutt concludes by asserting that he "hopes to identify both the implicit argument and the implicit speaker with David Hume" (ibid.). Accordingly, Hurlbutt urges that Hume's thoughts and attitudes toward theology and religion cannot be identified with those ofany one ofthe explicit speakers, such as Philo or Cleanthes: "Rather, they must be identified with those of an implicit speaker, and the concept ofan implicit speaker is afunction of suggested or implicit meaning. And this last, ofcourse, is a concept ofart and aesthetics" (p. 216). Hurlbutt... (shrink)

The critic Cyril Connolly once pointed out that diarists don’t make novelists. He went on to describe the problem for the would-be writer. “Writing for oneself: no public. Writing for others: no privacy” (Cyril Connolly, Journal). This paper addresses Connolly's worry about the public ad private: how can we reconcile the inner and conscious dimension of speech with its outer and public dimension? For if what people mean by their words involves, or consists in, what they have in (...) mind when they speak then how can what someone has in mind — the meaning she attaches to her words — be at the same time publicly accessible to others on the basis of her behaviour? The issue is whether there is a notion of the linguistic meaning of an expression that can do justice to both speakers’ inner experience of comprehension and to what is outwardly available in their public practice. (shrink)